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Abstract
We consider the problem of peer selection for multimedia trans-
mission over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network to find a strategy model
for peer selection for each lost packet. Our problem consists of two
parts one related to the P2P network that is a peer selection method,
and the other is related to the uplink bandwidth that each peer in the
network receives from a licensed spectrum holder. Moreover, if a peer
wants to download a desired packet from another peer in the network,
it should pay a certain amount of money to the source to download
a packet. Also, if a node in the P2P network wants to use its up-
link rate to send a packet to another peer in the network, it should
pay some money to the primary user in order to use the primary user
bandwidth. In addition, in peer selection method every node in the
P2P network decides its peers based on a model that maximizes its
utility function. On the other hand, the interaction between the P2P
network and spectrum holder is cast in the framework of Stackelberg
games and we use game theory model for this part of the report. It
is worth mentioning that we consider the P2P network in different
situations based on peers’ characteristics in the network.
1 Introduction
Nowadays multimedia applications that use P2P network have become in-
creasingly attractive. Each peer in the P2P network can act as both server
and receiver, this characteristic of the P2P network makes them even more
attractive. Which means that every peer can send packets to other peers,
while receiving a packet from the others. This feature also makes them more
attractive for video streaming applications.
One of the files sharing application that use P2P network is BitTorrent[1].
BitTorrent use tit-for-tat algorithm for peer selection in which every node in
the network selects those nodes with the highest uplink rate as its peers and
in return, it sends its contents to these peers. Tit-for-tat algorithm dose not
take into account simultaneously sharing of multiple multimedia files and
also cannot make any differentiation for different packets which may have
different preference for peers. Thus, tit-for-tat does not fully reveal the joint
manners of peers.
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In this report we will try to find a solution for video streaming over P2P
network in which uplink and downlink rate have important interest. We will
consider our model in different situations based on connectivity of peers and
buffer size of peers in the network. Each peer tries to be in coalition with
nodes that have higher bandwidth. Thus, we can model our problem in game
theory with autonomous and rational players, struggling to have the highest
possible utility value.
We use Pareto optima to find the best possible utility for the peers in the
network. Moreover, we will take into account the cost that the uplink rate
can have for each node in the network, as the result, there will be a provider
who charges nodes based on the uplink rate that they have which means a
higher uplink rate would have a higher cost. Thus, there is another game
between nodes in the P2P network and the uplink rate provider which casts
in the format of Stackelberg game method.
This report is organized as follow: in section 2 we will speak about game
theory tools that we used in our problem, in section 3 we will find a model for
our problem and use mathematical methods to solve this problem, in section
4 we will have simulation for different situation of the P2P network and also
for the bandwidth provider, in section 5 there is a discussion about a related
work to our model, and this section is followed by a conclusion which is the
last section of this report.
2 Game Theory
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in the social
sciences. Game theory is the study of problems of conflict and cooperation
among independent decision-makers.
2.1 Essential Concepts in Game Theory
A game is defined by the triplet G = (P, S, U)
• Player
A player is an agent who makes decisions in a game.
• Strategy
In a game in strategic form, a strategy is one of the given possible
actions of a player.
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• Utility
A utility is a number, which reflects the desirability of an outcome to
a player, for whatever reason.
• Rationality
A player is said to be rational if he seeks to play in a manner, which
maximizes his own utility. It is often assumed that the rationality of
all players is common knowledge.
We concentrate on dynamic games of complete information, mostly on
Stackelberg model. [6]
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
Suppose that players forecast the strategies of their opponents. In order
for this prediction to be correct, it is essential that each player be willing
to select the strategy predicted by the theory. Thus, each player’s predicted
strategy must be that player’s best response to the predicted strategies of the
other players. Such a forecast could be called strategically stable, because
no single player wants to deviate from his or her predicted strategy. We
call such a prediction a Nash equilibrium: In the n-player normal-form game
G = {S1, · · · , Sn; u1, · · · , un}, the strategies (u∗1, · · · , u∗n) are Nash equilib-
rium if s∗i is the player i best response to the strategies specified for the n-1
others, (s∗1, · · · , s∗i−1, s∗i+1, · · · , s∗n)
ui(s
∗
1, · · · , s∗i−1, s∗i , s∗i+1, · · · , s∗n) ≥ ui(s∗1, · · · , s∗i−1, si, s∗i+1, · · · , s∗n) (1)
In other words:
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, · · · , s∗i−1, si, s∗i+1, · · · , s∗n) (2)
It follows that, by definition, for a strategy combination (s1, · · · , sn) that
does not form a Nash equilibrium, at least one player will have an motivation
to differ to another strategy [2].
2.3 Pareto Optimumality
A strategy profile is Pareto-optimal if it is not possible to increase the utility
of any player without decreasing the utility of another player.That is, a Pareto
Optimal utility cannot increase without decreasing at least the utility of one
of the players.
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2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete Information
In this subset players’ utility is a common knowledge for all. This branch
consists of two kinds of games:
1. Perfect Information
At each turn the player owing the turn knows the full history of the
game. In other words, a player knows the strategy of its opponents in
the past.
2. Imperfect Information
Players do not know the full history of the game or simply, a player
may not know exactly previous choices.
It is worth noticing that the main issue in this kind of game is credibility
[2], which means that in every move that any player takes he thinks players
previous moves were based on maximization of their utilities.
We focus on Stackelberg game, which is a branch of dynamic game of
complete and perfect information game, but before going deeply in that area,
we cast a look at backward induction, since it has an important role in
Stackelberg games.
2.4.1 Backward Induction
Backward induction is a technique to solve a game of perfect information. It
first considers the last moves of the game, and determines the best move for
the player in each case. Then, taking these as given future actions, it proceeds
backwards in time, again determining the best move for the respective player,
until the beginning of the game is reached [6]. The key features of a dynamic
game of complete and perfect information are:
• The moves are in sequence
• All pervious moves are known before the next move is taken place
• For each combination of players moves, utilities are common knowledge[2]
Games with these characteristics are solved by backward induction. Back-
ward induction is used to find Stackelberg games’ equilibriums, thus we de-
scribe how to solve a two-level backward induction.
• Player 1 chooses an action a1 from the A1.
• Player 2 chooses an action a2 from the A2.
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• Utilities are u1(a1, a2) and u2(a1, a2).
When it is player 2’s action time, he will face following problem, given the
action a1 previously chosen by player 1:
max
a2∈A2
u2(a1, a2)
R2(a1) is player 2’s best reaction tworad player 1 . Since both players can
predict each other action, player 1’s action at the first stage is
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1, R2(a1))
If we assume player 1’s best action is a∗1, we call (a
∗
1, R2(a
∗
1)) the backwards-
induction outcome of the game.
The backward induction is again based on credibility. That is player 1 knows
player 2 moves is in a way that player 2 will recieve maximum utility based
on player one moves.
2.5 Stackelberg Game
The Stackelberg model in economy consists of a leader firm which moves first
and a follower firm which moves after. The Stackelberg model is solved by
finding the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium1 of the game. To calculate
SPNE we first need to find the best reaction of follower to any quantity of
its leader, thus we use backward induction to solve this kind of game. In
a Stackelberg game the leader announces its strategy and follower responds
to it rationally, as far as the leader knows the follower cost function, it can
compute follower’s reaction to all of its strategies. The timing of a Stackelberg
game is as follows: [2]
1. Leader chooses a quantity q1 > 0
2. Follower observes q1 and then chooses a quantity q2 > 0
3. Payoff for player i is:
ui(qi, qj) = [P (qi + qj)− Ci(qi)]qi (3)
1A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is a set of strategies {si, i = 1, . . . , n}
such that for each subgame g, the set of induced strategies {si(g), i = 1, . . . , n} forms a
Nash equilibrium for this subgame
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Price for firms is P (q1 + q2) which is simply the function of total output.
Moreover, we suppose that firm i has cost function as Ci(qi).
We use backward induction to solve a Stackelberg game, thus first we need
to calculate the follower best response to an arbitrary quantity of leader.
max
q2>0
u2(q1, q2) = [P (q1 + q2)− C2(q2)]q2 (4)
The values of q2 satisfying this response are follower’s best response. For
the best responses of the leader we need to find the follower best responses
as a function of the leader possible actions, R2(q1), and then maximize the
leader utility:
max
q1>0
u1(q1, R2(q1)) = [P (q1 +R2(q1))− C1(q1)]q1 (5)
These two maximizations can easily be found by just a derivation of each
utility with respect to its given quantity and put the result equal to zero and
find the respective value that satisfies the resulting expression. To have a
better understanding of the problem we bring an example.
Supposing that the cost functions of both leader and follower are zero
that is C1(q1) and C2(q2) are equal to zero; moreover, the inverse demand
function is P (q1 + q2) = A− B(q1 + q2) (A and B are constants). q∗1 and q∗2
are the leader and follower best answers.
u2(q1, q2) = (A−Bq1)q2 − Bq22 (6)
and player 2 best reaction is:
∂u2
∂q2
= 0 −→ R2(q1) = A−Bq1
2B
(7)
firm 1’s best answer will be:
u1 =
A
2
q1 − B
2
q21 (8)
so;
∂u1
∂q1
= 0 −→ q∗1 = 2q∗2 =
A
2B
(9)
As a result in a two-player Stackelberg game we have these characteristics;
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• Cost function of each player depends on the both players strategies.
• Each player tries to minimize its cost function.
2.5.1 One leader many followers
Most Stackelberg games consist of a leader and a follower that replies to
leader strategy “rationally” by selecting a strategy that minimizes its cost
function. But if we have more than one follower, we cannot distinctively
reveal what is meant by “rational” response of the followers. As a result, the
leader should know not only the followers cost function but also their “mood
of play” which can be of two kinds non-cooperative or cooperative. In non-
cooperative mode among followers we can consider their Nash equilibrium
as their strategy in response to a leaders strategy. In case of cooperation we
can use Pareto optimal as a case of modeling [4].
3 Problem Definition
The P2P network that we assume is a kind of overlay hybrid decentralized
system model. All peers are connected to a centralized server, which has all
the information about the peers in the network (IP, connection bandwidth,
files, multimedia content, etc.). Peers can use this information to exchange
multimedia content with each other. A typical decentralized P2P architec-
ture is depicted in Fig. 1.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: An architecture of hybrid decentralized P2P network [5](1a) Reg-
istering process (1b) Interacting process
In P2P network, uplink rate is the most important source [3], thus peers
ask for cost to contribute their uplink rate to others in the network. On the
other hand, the uplink rate is not the only resources that has effect on the
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utility of the peers, thus it is essential that a peer select other peers in order
to have cooperation in a way that it would have the highest possible utility.
We consider our problem in three different cases for the P2P network
based on difference of connectivity and buffer state of peers. But before
going to simulation we firstly, try to present a model for our system and
formulate that model and after all we will use a mathematical method to
find a solution for our model.
3.1 System Model
Our system consists of two separate parts: the primary user or bandwidth
provider for nodes in the P2P network, and the secondary network, which is
our P2P network. The primary user is the real owner of the bandwidth that
peers use to send packets to each other and can give them the permission to
use the bandwidth so that they can upload files each other. The secondary
network is a group of peers that want to use the bandwidth of the primary
user to share their video packets and try to receive their lost packet form
each other in order to increase their quality of service.
The primary user based on the bandwidth that releases for the secondary
network will receive money form them. So, it will try to release bandwidth in
a way that it would receive more money from the secondary network. While
the secondary network tries to use bandwidth in an efficient way, which means
that it will try to use it in a way that the network will have the highest pos-
sible utility and pays the least possible amount of money to the primary user.
As we can see there is an interaction between the primary and the sec-
ondary network, thus this interaction will lead us to game theory methods
for our model.
At first we will try to find a model that is suitable for the secondary
network, which is a P2P video streaming network, and we simulate this
network for three different cases, which are:
• Case A: Secondary network is a completely connected network and at
time zero2 buffer contents are the same.
• Case B: Secondary network is a completely connected network and at
time zero buffers have different packets.
2time zero is the time that simulation is started
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• Case C: Secondary network is not completely connected which means
that from a node might have no direct link to another node in the
network, moreover, buffers contains different packets at time zero.
Before going to simulation part for different cases, we describe our mathe-
matical model and use Lagrange theorem to solve our model analytically.
3.1.1 Utility Model
In order to formulate a utility model for a video streaming node in a P2P
network, firstly we should know that the utility consists of two major parts:
one related to the attributes of node i and the other related to connectivity
model of node i which means to which nodes in the network it is connected.
As we know some characteristics like what a node’s buffer contains, what
packet it has missed, preference of each packet, downlink and uplink rate,
the cost that it will pay to a neighbor to download a missed packet from
it, and uplink cost are amongst most important characteristics that can be
effective in modeling the utility in a P2P network. Thus, utility of a given
node depends on a set as:
Ai = {Pi,Di,pi, RUi , RDi , ci} (10)
Pi is the set of packet that node i owns, andDi is the set of packets that node
i is missed, pi is the preference factor set which is ordered by popularity of
packets it means that a more popular packet has higher weight, also we have∑|pi|
j=1 pij = 1. In addition, R
U
i , R
D
i are uplink and downlink rate respectively.
ci consists of two part one related to the uplink cost of node i (c
U
i ), the other
is related to the money that it will pay to one of its neighbor to download a
missed packet from him (cpi ).
We assume that if a user download a lost packet j form a peer, then its
multimedia quality will increase as a function of downlink rate and pij(the
preference factor) of that packet. We use function Q(RD) to represent the
achieved quality by a given downlink rate equal to RD.
Therefore, we define utility function for user i as:
Ui =
∑
j∈Di
pijQ(R
D
l ) +
∑
k∈Pi
(cpiki − cUik)RUi −
∑
j∈Di
c
pij
l R
D
l (11)
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As we see in Eq. 11 utility of user i depends on Pi,Di, p, R
D, c
p
i , c
U
ik, R
U ,
and l is the peer from whom lost packet j is downloaded. It means that
utility of a given node depends on packets that it owns and also packets that
it needs with their importance weighted with the so-called preference factor
(pij).
Moreover, when a node sends a packet to a peer it will ask form the re-
ceiver a certain amount of money depending on the preference factor packet
and also the rate of that packet, thus if a node can send a packet with a
better quality, it will ask for more money. The cost that a node should pay
in order to receive packet number j form peer l is c
pij
l and the benefit that
node i can gain when it sends a packet to a node is denoted by cpiki .
Additionally, the sender of the packet must pay some amount of money
to the primary user (cUik) because of using the uplink bandwidth, which is
originally owned by the primary user, to send a packet which is denoted by
cUik. It is worth mentioning that all cost are factor of rate so there are multi-
plied by the rate of up\downlink rate.
As we can deduct, the sum of the paid cost of the secondary network
to the primary user makes the body of the primary user utility. Thus, the
utility of the primary van be modeled as:
Upri =
∑
i
∀i∈ secondary network
∑
k∈Pi
cUikR
U
i (12)
Here we can conclude that there is an interaction between the primary
user and the secondary network users. We summarized all of our modeling
parameters in Table 1 to have a better over view of the model.
3.1.2 Utility Analysis
The primary user addition to the uplink bandwidth, also he decides on the
relationship between the cost and rate of each node in the secondary network.
The constraint of the primary user is modeled as:
aRUi − bcpij = C (13)
In Eq. 13 C is a constant and a, b are weights of rate and cost respectively.
When a user wants to download a lost packet from one of his peers, he will
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Symbol Definition
pij Denotes the preference factor
of peer i on the packet j
Q(.) Quality of service function
RUi Uplink rate of node i
RDi Downlink rate of node i
c
j
U Cost of uplink to peer j
c
pik
i Benefit that node i gains
from sending packet k to a peer
cUik Cost of uplink from node i to its k
th peer
c
pij
l Cost that node i pays to download
packet k from peer l
Pi Set of shared packets of peer i
Di Set of missed packets of peer i
Upri Utility function of the primary user
Ui Utility function of peer i
Table 1: List of symbols and definitions in our utility models.
choose a peer who has less cost and higher rate, in the other word, it chooses
one who can maximize its utility function for that specific packet. So, when
node i wants to choose its peer l for a lost packet j it comes up with the
following:
max
l
Uij ≈ max
l
(pijQ(R
D
l )− cpijl RDl ) (14)
To maximize Eq. 14 with constraint (Eq. 13) we have:
G = Uij − λ(aRUi − bcpij − C)
G = (pijQ(R
D
l )− cpijl RDl )− λ(aRUi − bcpij − C) (15)
We use Lagrange method to maximize G with respect toRU , cpij , λ; moreover,
Q(.) is well estimated with ln(.), thus we have:
∂G
∂RDl
= pij
1
RDl
− cpij − aλ = 0 (16)
∂G
∂cpij
= −RDl + bλ = 0 (17)
∂G
∂λ
= aRUi − bcpij − C = 0 (18)
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From the Eq. 17 we find that RDl = bλ and using Eq. 16 we can find
cpij =
pij
bλ
− aλ and from Eq. 18 we find that λ = C+
√
C2+8abpij
4ab
as the result
the optimal value of cost and rate can be found as:
R∗Dl =
C +
√
C2 + 8abpij
4a
(19)
c∗pij =
4apij
C +
√
C2 + 8abpij
− C +
√
C2 + 8abpij
4b
(20)
4 Numerical Example
Now that we could mathematically model our problem and found a maxi-
mization technique, we are going to have simulation for our 3 aforementioned
cases of the secondary network. After that we will analyze the whole sec-
ondary and the primary network using Stackelberg game for the rational
response of the secondary network as a whole.
4.1 Secondary Network Simulation
Before going to simulation of different cases, we define parameters that we
will use for our simulation model.
The number of packets that each node reads at each time stamp for the
video stream is called buffer read and it is equal for all nodes in all-different
cases. Furthermore, depending on the simulating case there would be delays
among buffer contents of peers. In addition, based on the case that we sim-
ulate, there might be difference in buffer contents of peers (some have more
packets and some have less packets). D is randomly chosen for the secondary
network nodes, beside that every node knows what packets its neighbors have
and need, also the up\downlink rate of its neighbors. In the other word, all
nodes have a complete information about their neighbors.
In order to verify the efficiency of the aforesaid peer selection algorithm
based on Lagrange maximization, every node, instead of following the peer
selection algorithm, will also choose a potential peer randomly. We are sup-
posed to have a better result for the case using Lagrange theorem.
We run the case simulation for 100 times, for each iteration we change
the cost that node i would ask from its peers upon sending packet j with
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the preference factor of pij to him. This cost distribution will also fulfill the
primary user forced constraint. Our cost distribution is based on consider-
ing; a better node in the sense of quality (higher uplink rate) has a higher
cost. After all iterations we will compute Pareto optima of the game and we
find which cost distribution is a Pareto optimal for our simulation model. As
mentioned before we characterize our different cases depending on the con-
nectivity of the nodes and buffer contents of our nodes 3 different cases and
we simulate both the primary and the secondary network together for case
C, since this is a more realistic case. Table 2 summarizes numerical value of
each case.
Case A B C
Number of Secondary 30 30 30
Network Nodes
Minimum Uplink 60 60 60
Rate [kbps]
Minimum Number Fully Fully 10
of Connection Connected Connected
a, b, C 1, 50, 50 1, 50, 50 1, 50, 50
Buffer Read 30 30 30
Maximum Buffer Delay3 0 10 10
Window 30 Randomly Randomly
Size Chosen Chosen
Uplink Randomly Randomly Randomly
Cost Chosen Chosen Chosen
Number of 100 100 100
Iterations
Table 2: Summarization of simulation parameters for different cases of the
secondary network model
4.1.1 Case A
In this model we assume that all nodes are connected together and the video
stream is started at the same time for all nodes, thus peers receive the same
packets in every time stamp, no delay among peers. Moreover, number of
the packets that reaches a node is equal to the number of packets that it
3All nodes have the same video stream, but some nodes might have started their stream
sooner than others. The maximum number of packets because of this asynchronization of
peers is denoted by maximum buffer delay
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reads in each time stamp and is equal to 30.
Fig. 2 shows the CDF of the secondary network utility and the utility
value of the secondary network during the simulation time. Utility of the
secondary network is equal to sum of the utility of each node per simulation
time. As we see in this figure when we use our suggested peer selection
algorithm, the secondary network could gain higher utility value comparing
to just randomly select a potential a neighbor.
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Figure 2: Utility of the secondary network (Case A), LS: Lagrange selection
method, RS: Random selection method (2a) Utility CDF (2b) Utility value
for each iteration
Moreover, in Fig. 3 we randomly choose a node in the secondary network
(node number 5) and its utility CDF, and value for the whole simulation
time. We can see in both figures that our algorithm works extremely better
than the random selection method.
4.1.2 Case B
In this model the secondary network is fully connected but peers are not syn-
chronized, thus there is buffer delay among them and the maximum buffer
delay is equal to 10 packets, which is randomly assigned to the nodes. Besides
the buffer delay, we assume that the video streaming downlink rates of peers
are not the same. These rates difference lead to variation in nodes buffer
contents and it does not contain the same number of packets, some peers
will have more packets and some less. If a node has bigger buffer contents,
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Figure 3: Utility of node 5 (Case A), LS: Lagrange selection method, RS:
Random selection method(3a) Node 5 utility CDF (3b) Utility value of node
5 for the whole simulation time
in each time stamp it can increase its quality of service more comparing to a
node, which has fewer packets in its buffer. Since at each time stamp it can
look for more lost packets in his buffer and download them if they exist in
the network; furthermore, it can share more packet for other peers and gain
money from them. Buffer contents size of node (video stream downlink rate)
of nodes is randomly distributed among all secondary network nodes.
In Fig. 4a we plotted the normalized CDF of the secondary network util-
ity by the highest utility value. In addition, Fig. 4b shows the secondary
network utility value of the secondary network for the entire simulation. In
addition, to have a better understanding of the secondary network utility dis-
tribution the variance and mean it have great importance so, we also plotted
µ − σ and µ + σ for both random and suggested algorithm for neighbor se-
lection method . If we compare µ± σ in both cases, we can deduce that our
suggested algorithm works better than just randomly select a peer.
In Fig. 5 we again chose node 5 and plot its CDF and utility value for
both algorithms during all iterations. In Fig. 5b we can also see that node
5 has higher utility value for the suggested algorithm comparing to random
selection algorithm. These figures gain show that our suggested algorithm
works better.
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Figure 4: Utility of the secondary network (Case B), LS: Lagrange selection
method, RS: Random selection method (4a) Utility CDF (4b) Utility value
for each iteration
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Figure 5: Utility of node 5 (Case B), LS: Lagrange selection method, RS:
Random selection method(5a) Node 5 utility CDF (5b) Node 5 utility value
4.1.3 Case C
In this model not only the original video downlink rates of peers and as the
result buffers contents are not the same but also the secondary network is
not fully connected. Connectivity of node is randomly chosen and each node
has at least 10 peers. The other simulation parameters of this model is the
same as other cases
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In Fig. 6a we plot the normalized CDF of the secondary network utility
and µ ± σ for both algorithms. Furthermore, Fig. 6b shows utility value of
the secondary network for different iterations of both algorithms.
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Figure 6: Utility of the secondary network (Case C), LS: Lagrange selection
method, RS: Random selection method (6a) Utility CDF (6b) Utility value
for each iteration
In Fig. 7 we chose a random node in the secondary network (Node 14th)
and plotted its CDF and utility for both peer selection methods. As we can
see again our algorithm works better comparing to random selection method.
4.1.4 Stackelberg
In this simulation part we select case C for the secondary network model,
since it is more realistic to P2P video streaming network. Given that we have
one leader (primary user), and many followers (secondary network peers) we
need to decide on the mood of play for the secondary network. We use co-
operative mood of play, thus we should use Pareto optimal output of the
secondary network as a rational response to the primary user. In addition,
to have a better utility result for the secondary network we choose social
optimum4 of the secondary network as the rational response.
As we can see in Eq. 12 the utility of the primary user depends on the
rate, link cost, and the number of the secondary network nodes. In this part
4Social optimum is a Pareto optimum which is maximum among other Pareto optima
of the game
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Figure 7: Utility of node 14 (Case B), LS: Lagrange selection method, RS:
Random selection method(7a) Node 14 Utility CDF (7b) The utility value
of node 14 in each iteration
of simulation we decrease the number of the secondary network nodes to 10,
beside that we also decrease the number of iterations for the secondary net-
work utility calculation into 50 and run Stackelberg simulation for 100 times.
In addition, we will consider the effect of link cost (money that the sec-
ondary network’s nodes should pay to the primary user in order to use the
released bandwidth for uplink rate of nodes in the network) on the primary
user utility. In Table 3 we summarized simulation parameters for the Stack-
elberg game of the primary-secondary players.
In Fig. 8a we plot the CDF of the primary user utility, while the secondary
network is in case C and it runs suggested algorithm for peer selection. In
Fig. 8b we plot the utility of the primary user for each iteration. It is worth
mentioning that the link cost of the iteration number i is higher for the sec-
ondary network nodes comparing to the iteration number i− 1.
In Fig. 9 we plot the utility of the primary user versus the total amount
of link cost that the secondary network pays to the primary user in each
iteration. We can see in the figure if the link cost is increased, the primary
user utility will increase as well and this could be realized from the primary
user utility model.
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Stackelberg Uplink
Parameter Cost
Number of Secondary 10
Network Nodes
Minimum Uplink 60
Rate [kbps]
Minimum Number 3
of Connection
a, b, C 1, 50, 50
Buffer Read 30
Maximum Buffer Delay 10
Window Randomly
Size Chosen
Number of Iter. 50
for Sec. Net.
Number of Iter. 100
for Primary. Net.
Table 3: Summarization of simulation parameters for Stackelberg game
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Figure 8: Utility of the primary user, the secondary network model is case
C (8a) CDF of the primary user utility function (8b) Primary user utility of
the for all iterations
Thus, if the primary user increases the link cost its utility will be in-
creased as well. As the result of the link cost augment by the primary user,
the secondary network should pay more money to the primary user per link
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Figure 9: Utility of the primary user vs sum of the uplink cost for the sec-
ondary network
usage thus its utility value will be decreased. If we assume that the sec-
ondary network has a minimum acceptable utility, then the primary user can
increase its link usage cost to reach this limit. At this point if the primary
user increases its link cost, then the secondary network nodes will not share
any packets with each other as a result the utility of the primary user goes to
zero. Since there is no hard limit for the secondary network utility value in
our simulation model, thus the primary user can increase its link cost with-
out any limitations.
Totally, during all simulation results we observed that our suggested algo-
rithm for peer selection works better than just random selection method and
we could also prove it by using some mathematical methodology in analysis
section. Moreover, by using Stackelberg game we could maximize the utility
of the secondary and primary network.
5 Related Work
There are many applications of game theory in wireless communication and
networking, researchers have tried to solve many problems in network op-
timization by using of game theory. For example; spectrum sharing for
unlicensed band, video streaming in P2P networks, maximizing spectrum
utilization of cognitive radio network using channel allocation and power
control, and coalition based multimedia peer matching strategies for P2P
networks. The most related one to our model is the last one, and we will
explicitly explain it.
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5.1 Coalition based Multimedia Peer Matching Strate-
gies for P2P Networks
In this paper, they assumed that peers utility improves as they can download
their desired packet and also there is uploading cost which decrease utility
of peers. Hence, the utility function of peer i, which is downloading the
demanded content Dik at rate RDik and providing upload rate RUi to other
peers is denoted as follow:
Ui(RDik , RUi) =
{
0 if RDik > RUi
pikQi(RDik)− ciRUi otherwise
(21)
where pik denotes the preference factor of peer i on the multimedia content
Dik ∈ Di and a non-negative constant RreqDik represents the specifc minimum
required rates to decode the video sequence.
In this paper they focused on a one-to many peers’s interaction. Let
C1 = {1, · · · , N} be the coalition set of peer 1 with (N − 1) peers. Peer 1
download its desired packet form peers in this set and shares its possessed
packets (P1) also with this group of peers. Thus, the utility of peers in the
coalition are expressed as:
U1 = p11Q1

 ∑
i∈C1\{1}
RUi1

− c1

 ∑
i∈C1\{1}
RU1i

 (22)
Ui = pijQi

RU1i + ∑
l∈Ci\{1,i}

− ci

RUi1 + ∑
l∈Ci\{1,i}

 (23)
pij is the preference factor of peer i on the j
th packet, and RU1i denotes
the upload rate of peer 1 to peer i. Utility of peer i depends on the uplink
rate provided by peer 1 and other peers in coalition with peer i which is Ci.
Every node in the network should achieve a minimum utility, thus we
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have:
RUi1 > max
{
R
req
D11
, Q−11

c1
(∑
l∈C1\{1}
RU1l
)
p11

}− ∑
l∈C1\{1,i}
RUl1 (24)
RUi1 ≤
pijQi
(
RU1i +
∑
l∈C1\{1,i}
RUli
)
ci
−
∑
l∈Ci\{1,i}
RUil , R
MAX
Ui1
(25)
for all i ∈ C1\{1}. Eq. 24 can be expressed using RMAXUi1 in Eq. 25 as:
RUi1 ≥ max
{
R
req
D11
, Q−11

c1
(∑
l∈C1\{1}
RU1l
)
p11


}
−
∑
l∈C1\{1,i}
RUMAX
l1
, RUmini1
(26)
Therefore, the upload rate RUi1 can be expressed as:
RUi1 = θi · RminUi1 + (1− θi) ·RMAXUi1 (27)
with variable (0 ≤ θi ≤ 1). RreqDij is the minimum downlink rate required for
the desired packet. We see that RMAXUi1 and R
min
Ui1
depend on upload rate of
peer 1 to its coalition peers. Thus, the achievable utilities in coalision C1
can be expressed as a function of peer 1’s upload rates to its coalition peers
given the other coalition parameters. To resolve the problem based on game
theoric appraoch they tried to map the problem to barganing set-up with N
player, which is not in the same approach as we did in our problem so, we
will not speak about this game theory methodology.
6 Conclusion
In this report, we considered the problem of peer selection for video stream-
ing in P2P networks. We proposed a peer selection algorithm, which enables
nodes in the P2P network to choose the best possible sets of peers for video
packets sharing. Simulations revealed that our suggested algorithm for peer
selection method could maximize the utility of the peers in the P2P network.
Moreover, we considered the effect of the suggested algorithm for different
cases based on the characteristics of a typical P2P network, in all of the
cases our algorithm worked better than just random selection of the peers.
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In addition, we toke into account the uplink rate cost that the peering nodes
should pay for packet sharing to the link owner, and we proposed that this
could be well modeled in the framework of Stackelberg game. Moreover, for
this part we had a simulation and used Stackelberg game with the coopera-
tive mood of play based on the Pareto optimal of the P2P network as their
rational response and we could see the effect of link cost on the P2P network.
Totally, the proposed peer selection strategies can enhance the performance
of existing P2P network by efficiently choosing peers in the existing of a link
holder network.
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